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CUPRINS
José María ZAMORA CALVO, Stoic Politeia Revisited 5 Adriana NEACȘU, Human Mantic Art and Divine Mantic Art. Iamblichus’ Criticism on
Divination Common Forms 19
Ionuț RĂDUICĂ, Revoluția copernicană în interpretarea lui Hans Blumenberg 37
Adrian NIȚĂ, Leibniz’s Quasi-monism 47
Vicente Lozano DÍAZ, Reality and Knowledge in Henri Bergson 61 Fernando GILABERT, Aeternitas vs ἀεί: Heidegger y la ruptura con la teología 75 Adrian HAGIU, Despre abuzul hermeneutic: problematica sinelui la Paul Ricœur și
Galen Strawson 92
Anna IVANOVA, The Problem of the Criterion and the Disparities between the Epistemic
and the Linguistic Norms of Knowledge 107
Marcin CZAKON, Mathematical Structuralism and Purely Formal Theory 117 D. PANDEESWARI, A. HARIHARASUDAN, Sebastian KOT, Paradigm of Postmodern
Paranoia in Preeti Shenoy’s Life Is What You Make It and Wake Up, Life Is Calling 135 Vasile HAȚEGAN, Philosophical Meditation, a Tool for Personal Development and
Leadership 163
Ana BAZAC, Cum trebuie să privim popularizarea științei? Cu un studiu al cazurilor
Mircea Malița și Solomon Marcus 176
Tetiana TSYMBAL, Women's Emigration in Contemporary Ukraine: Social and Philosophical
Aspects 213
Recenzie
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, The Unconscious: a Conceptual Analysis. New York and London, Routledge, 2004, 122 p.
Armand A. VOINOV 231
AUTHORS/CONTRIBUTORS 235
CONTENTS 237
STOIC POLITEIA REVISITED
José María ZAMORA CALVO1 Abstract: This article addresses a specific aspect of the political theory of the early Stoics: that of the criticism, or rather the authentic rejection, that the Republics of Zeno and Chrysippus direct to the Platonic conception of the ideal city. To this end, I will discuss a key passage from a skeptic of uncertain date called Cassius, transmitted by Diogenes Laertius (7, 32-33), where the question of the Zenonian Republic is posed sequentially from cynical assumptions in six capital points. The Stoic Politeia does not really intend to replace the cities existing in its days, but to build a universal and egalitarian republic compatible with the community of wise men.
Keywords: Zeno of Citium, Republic, Stoicism, Chrysippus, education for virtue, exercise.
The early Stoics believed that the traditional political constitutions – monarchy, aristocracy, oligarchy and democracy – were bad, and preferred a kind of “mixture of all three”: “They [the Stoics] say that the best constitution is a combination (miktên) ofdemocracy, monarchy and aristocracy” (D.L. 7, 131 = SVF 3, 700; LS67U). In comparison to the three classes of Plato’s Republic, Zeno’s Politeia lacks a dominant minority class of philosopher-kings, although it does not repudiate the notion of a
“philosophical republic”.
Although the Stoic state does not differentiate between the classes, it does declare a preference for a monarchical system, in which sovereignty would devolve upon a wise and virtuous man, who would symbolise the rule of reason in the universe and guarantee a “well-organised society” run by a philosopher. However, as Muller (2006, 247-248) contends, it is by no means certain that the political ideas of the Stoics can be applied to a particular national context. In general terms, the Stoic wise man will live in accordance with the laws of his country and will adapt his actions in line
1 Autonomous University of Madrid, Spain.
This paper benefited from the support of the Spanish R&D project: “Pensar las emocionesen la Atenas democrática: diálogo entre la comedia y la filosofía (Pathe) – Programa Logos Fundación BBVA de ayudas a la investigaciónen el área de Estudios Clásicos 2019”, and is part of the activities of the UAM Research Group:
Influences of Greek Ethics on Contemporary Philosophy (Ref. F-055).
with the specific circumstances, whether by involving himself in politics or distancing himself from it, as he must always place the best of himself at the service of humankind.
In his treatise titled On the Fortune or the Virtue of Alexander, Plutarch describes Zeno’s dream (onar) of a single community, a single way of life and a single order for all men, governed by a single common law (nomos koinos).
“(1) The much admired Republic of Zeno […] is aimed at this one main point, that our household arrangements should not be based on cities or Parishes, each one marked out by its own legal system, but we should regard all men as our fellow-citizens and local residents, and there should be one way of life and order, like that of a herd grazing together and nurtured by a common law (nomôi koinôi). (2) Zeno wrote this, picturing as it were a dream (onar) or image (eidôlon) of a philosopher'swell-regulated society (eidôlon eunomias philosophou).”
(Plutarch, De Alexandri magni fortuna aut virtute, 329a8-b5 = SVF 1, 262; LS67A;
transl. Long and Sedley 1987, 429).
Zeno’s republic would encompass all men and all of the cities, towns and villages in existence. Brunschwig and Pellegin (2001, 553, n. 1) interpret philosophou as an adjective denoting a “philosophical republic”, as opposed to the reading of Long and Sedley (1987, 429), which considers it to be a noun: “a philosopher's well-regulated society”. This Stoic “image”(eidôlon) of a government and a good philosophical politeia seems to suggest a theoretical model for a universal city, which Alexander put into practice (Plutarch, 329b4-5). Thus, Alexander’s imperial ambitions brought to life the project of a common government that Zeno could only dream of or imagine.
The utopia of Zeno and Chrysippus, sketched out in the fragments that remain of their respective Republics, eschews the Platonic ideal of the tripartite city and instead proposes a “mixed” constitution that clearly differentiates between societies as they are in reality and society as it should be. In this respect, the “mixed” constitution is not built on the quality of its governors, who, as in Plato, are the only individuals who know the Good; rather, it is built on the fulfilment of a certain number of formal conditions: namely, an undifferentiated equilibrium, freedom, equality, the participation of all citizens and the free and mutual consent of all. The authority of reason is thereby guaranteed by the presence of common universal reason within each citizen. Consequently, unlike
specific laws and political regimes, the mixed constitution must imitate the universal city. The Stoic politeia is thus conceived along cosmopolitan lines.
Stoic cosmopolitanism implies the transposition into the moral sphere of the universal sympathy found in the natural sphere (cf. Coulmas 1990). The Stoics see the world as one large city ruled by physical laws and governed by logos, or common universal reason. Inasmuch as they partake of logos and live in the world, human beings are the citizens of this universal physical community (Clement of Alexandria, Stromateis, 4, 26, 172 = SVF 3, 327; Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, 6, 44; Cicero, De finibus, 3, 62-69). As such, merely by virtue of being human, all men are each other’s countrymen, and no one is foreign. Human beings all form part of one large family, in view of a natural interrelation derived from their shared partaking of a common rational nature that is connected to the idea of oikeiôsis. For the Stoics, the world is the common homeland of all men, and as such, all men are fellow citizens and dependent upon one another, like the constituent elements of a single organism (Cicero, De officiis, 3, 6, 28; 3, 17, 69; Hierocles, Elementa Moralia,1, 1-4; 1, 31-47; 1, 49-2, 31; 2, 33-45; 3, 19- 27; 3, 46-51; Stobaeus, Eclogae, 4, 671, 7-673, 11). Stoic cosmopolitanism derives from the rational nature of man, which connects him to his fellow citizens beyond the borders that delimit communities and nations. For the Stoics, no one is alone: rather, everyone forms part of a Whole, which is thus formed of the totality of all men and the totality of the cosmos (cf.
Schofield 1991, 93; 141-145).
This theory of a universal egalitarian republic is compatible with the notion of a community of the wise, as the Stoic politeia does not aim to replace the cities that are in existence at any given moment; rather, it aims to develop a “utopia” in opposition to Plato’s “ideal city” in accordance with the Cynic approach of Diogenes, thereby questioning the laws and regulations that govern traditional cities: “the wise man alone is free, and every fool is a slave” (D.L. 7, 121).
The Stoic theory of action puts forward a radical thesis that, moreover, arouses indignation in its opponents: namely, only that which has moral value is good (monon to kalonagathon) (D.L. 7, 101; Plutarch, De Stoicorum repugnantiis,1038d; SVF 3, 26). In a political sense, this thesis means that only those who are “excellent” or “virtuous” can be citizens.
In our discussion, we explore the idea that to be a citizen of the Stoic polis, one must be virtuous, i.e. one must know the theory and praxis of the things that must be done, the things that must not be done, and the things
that make no difference (Arius Didymus, Epitome of Stoic Ethics, 5b1 = BS 26.26; SVF 3, 262; LS 61H; Arius Didymus, Epitome, 5b5 = BS26.15; SVF 3, 280; LS 61D). However, unlike Plato and Aristotle, the limitations imposed by the fragmentary nature of the Stoics’ texts makes it very difficult to establish with any accuracy the details of their political theory and its implications for the subject that concerns us: namely, the politeia of the Stoa.
Zeno (334/333-262/261 BCE) was born in the Phoenician city of Citium, on the island of Cyprus. Around the year 312 he arrived in Athens, where he dedicated himself to the study of philosophy and founded the Stoic school (cf. Steinmetz 1994a; Forschner 1996). Zeno’s political ideas are linked to those of Plato, and he may have drawn inspiration, at least in part, from certain aspects of Plato’s Republic. We should not overlook the fact that the word politeia, which is traditionally translated as “republic”, can also mean “constitution” or “regime” in Greek. Like Plato, Zeno wrote a text titled Politeia, of which only a few fragments have survived. Plutarch considered this work to be a direct attack on Plato’s Republic (Plutarch, 1034e = SVF 1, 260). Cleanthes (331/330-230/229 BCE) also wrote a series of works on the subject: Politics, Laws and Monarchy; while Chrysippus (281/277-208/204 BCE), the third scholarch of the Stoa, wrote a treatise titled On the Republic (cf. Steinmetz 1994b). However, as we shall see, a number of Cynic traits that were adopted by the Stoics, such as the acceptance of incest, cannibalism, sexual freedom, the removal of the courts and temples, etc. distanced them from the members of the Academy with regard to certain central tenets of their conception of the ideal city, as described in the fragments of their works that have survived. Consequently, at first glance it seems as though certain aspects of the “Zenonian” Politeia are clearly related to Cynicism, and therefore stand apart from the Platonic model.
Although Stoic political philosophy began as an implicit dialogue with Plato (Schofield 1999a, 22-56), the two theories move in opposite directions, to the point at which the Stoic “utopia” can be considered a counterpoint to the Platonic concept of the “ideal city”. Although Plato was always on the radar of the Stoics, their foremost point of reference was Socrates, rather than Plato (or more specifically the Platonic Socrates) (cf. Boeri and Salles 2014, 744-745). Indeed, we can identify the “Socratic” traits of Stoic political theory inherited from the “Cynic asceticism” (Goulet-Cazé 2001 [1986]), which the Stoics incorporated into their approach. According to Epicurus, whose testimony comes to us through Diogenes Laertius, Zeno’s pupils were initially known as “Zenonians” before later acquiring the name
“Stoics” in reference to the “painted porch” (stoa poikilê, or portico of Attalus) in the Agora at Athens, where Zeno gave his lessons. Zeno’s teacher was Crates, and although the Cynics always claimed to be a Socratic school, the “Cynic Socrates” did not always coincide with the
“Platonic Socrates”.
Since the days of antiquity, the Politeia has been among Zeno’s best- known and most frequently cited works. The majority of the surviving fragments and testimonies of this work are from Diogenes Laertius (D.L. 6, 15; D.L. 7, 4 = SVF 1, 2; D.L. 7, 32-34 = SVF 1, 222, 226, 257, 259, 267, 268, 269;
D.L. 7, 121 = SVF 1, 270; D.L. 7, 129 = SVF 1, 248; D.L. 7, 131 = SVF 1, 269), Philodemus (On the Stoics, 2, 9, 1-12, 20; 4, 14, 4-15; 5-6, 15, 1-16; 6, 17, 4-10;
7-8, 18, 1-21, 18; Stoicorum Historia, 4 = SVF 1, 42) and Plutarch (Lycurgus, 31, 1, 1-2, 59a = SVF 1, 263; De Alexandri Magni Fortuna aut Virtute, 329a-b = SVF 1, 262; Quaestiones convivales, 3, 6, 1, 653e = SVF 1, 252; De Stoicorum repugnantis, 2, 1033b = SVF 1, 262; 6, 1034b = SVF 1, 264; 8, 1034e = SVF 1, 260), in addition to a number of Christian writers and theologians such as John Chrysostom (Homiliae in Evangelium S. Matthaei, 1, 4, 9 = SVF 1, 262), Clement of Alexandria (Stromateis, 5, 12, 76 = SVF 1, 264) and Origen of Alexandria (Contra Celsum, 1, 5, 59, 3 = SVF 1, 265): the latter group criticised and reproached Zeno for incorporating into his thought a series of concepts they considered immodest, scandalous, and incompatible with a rigorous and austere set of ethics. Such concepts were also defended by later members of the Stoic school. For Solana Dueso (2015), in Stoic political theory there is a marked opposition between the “abstract and utopian”
Politeia of Zeno, which contains the seeds of distinct modes of thought that (probably) first materialised themselves in Persaios of Kition (born ca.
300 BCE) and Sphaerus (a student of Zeno), then in Diogenes of Babylon (230-ca.150/140 BCE) and Antipaterof Tarsus (d. 130/129 BCE), and finally in Panaetius (d. 110/09 BCE) and Blossius (a student of Antipater). The clear defence of its authenticity mounted by Chrysippus removes any suspicion of a false attribution to the founder of the Stoic school: “That the Republic is the work of Zeno is confirmed by Chrysippus in his work On the Republic”
(D.L. 7, 34 = SVF 3, 203; transl. Mensch 2018,756).
The rhetor Isidore of Pergamon tells of how Athenodorus of Tarsus (1st c. BCE), more commonly known as Athenodorus Cordylion, the Stoic keeper of the library at Pergamon, tried to remove “inconvenient passages”
from Stoic treatises; these texts were subsequently returned to the works from which they had been expurgated (Follet 1994). These lurid passages
undoubtedly included some of the key fragments of Zeno’s Republic, which he wrote, as the contemporary saying went, “on the tail of a dog” (D.L. 7, 4, cf. Plutarch, De Stoicorum repugnatiis, 1, 1033d; Solana Dueso 2015, 76, n. 1;
Bees 2011, 7), i.e. under the Cynic influence to which he was exposed during the latter period – the “tail” – of his education with Crates (cf.
Goulet-Cazé 2003). However, although Zeno’s work is thought to share a number of Cynic traits, if we refer to the testimony of Philodemus we will discover that Zeno’s Republic contains elements that are characteristic of, and particular to, the Stoic tradition (cf. Husson 2011). The key content of Diogenes’s Politeia was incorporated by the Epicurean philosopher Philodemus of Gadara (1st c. BCE) into his work titled On the Stoics, fragments of which – accompanied by an extensive and documented commentary – were published by Dorandi (1982; cf. Dawson 1992,111-159;
Dorandi 1993).
A passage included by Diogenes Laertius in Book VII of his Lives of Eminent Philosophers (3rd c. CE) constitutes the most complete basis for a reconstruction of some of the key tenets of Zeno’s Republic (Schofield 1999a, 3-21; 1999b, 67-76). Nearly all of the annotated material is from the quill of Skeptic Cassius (ca.1st c. BCE-1st c. CE), who was the personal physician to the emperor Tiberius and a student of the Empiric school (Goulet-Cazé 2003, 40-41). In fact, we may consider Cassius, along with Isidore, as the main source of the “scandalous” material included by Diogenes Laertius in this passage (cf. D.L. 7, 34; Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrhonianae hypotyposeis, 3, 245-246 = SVF 1, 250; 1, 256 ; Hahm 1992, 4131-4135).
“There are some, however, including Cassius the Skeptic and his circle, who denounce Zeno on many grounds. They say, first of all, that he declared, at the beginning of his Republic, that general education (egkuklion paideian) is useless;
and secondly, that all persons who are not good are enemies, foes, slaves, and alien to one another: parents to children, brothers to brothers, and kinsmen to kinsmen. Again, in the Republic, he claims that only the good are citizens, friends, kinsmen, and free, so that for the Stoics parents and children are enemies, since they are not wise. Also in the Republic he holds that wives should be held in common (koinas), and at <line> two hundred prohibits the building of temples, law courts, and gymnasia in cities. As for money, he writes as follows: ‘We do not think money should be created, either for exchange or for traveling abroad.’ He also commands men and women to wear the same clothes and to keep no part of the body entirely hidden.” (D.L. 7, 32-33 = SVF 1, 226; LS 67B; BS 30.12; transl. Mensch 2018, 755-756).
Although many of the themes in Zeno’s Republic are Platonic, his treatment of them tends notably towards the ideas espoused by the Cynics (Schofield 1999a, 757-758). However, it is difficult to demonstrate whether Zeno did indeed write his Republic as an alternative to Plato’s work of the same name. The general themes that are explored in the Stoic text are not always clearly indicated, as the material that has survived to the present day is somewhat disjointed. Nonetheless, we can state that the aim of Zeno’s work, which was written on a single roll of papyrus (“around 200
‘lines’”), centres on the following six key points:
(1) Convention education is useless, and only the wise can form a political community. Zeno replaced the education-oriented study cycle of the Greek paideia with a training or exercise (askêsis)-based programme inherited from the Cynics, which he saw as the only true means of accessing virtue (D.L. 7, 104; cf. Goulet-Cazé 1986, 22-24; Laurand 2005, 60- 62). Effectively, the Cynics rejected so-called “general knowledge” (egkuklia mathêmata): music, geometry, astronomy and other related subjects, they believed, did not help anyone to lead a good life (D.L. 6, 73;6, 103-104; Rikj 1965). From the Stoic perspective, conventional education may act as an obstacle to the ability to access virtue in the correct manner. However, despite Zeno’s arguments, Chrysippus later acknowledged the usefulness of these “conventional” or “general” studies (D.L. 7, 129). Indeed, according to the testimony of Diogenes Laertius, for Antisthenes (who was considered the predecessor of the Cynics), “that virtue is a matter of deeds (tôn ergôn) and requires no abundance of words (logôn) or learning (mathêmatôn).” (D.L. 6, 11; transl. Mensch 2018, 624;cf. D.L. 6,7; 7, 21).
(2) Only citizens, friends, relatives and free men are virtuous: therefore, those who are not virtuous are “abhorrent”, “enemies”, “slaves” and
“estranged from one another”. From the very beginning of the school founded by Zeno, whose ideas were adopted by the majority of Stoics – including Cleanthes, the second scholarch – up until Chrysippus, the movement’s followers exalted the figure of the wise (sophos), virtuous (spoudaios), civilised (asteios), prudent man (phronimos), whom they placed in opposition to the foolish, despicable or contemptible (phauloi) (Arius Didymus, Epitome, 11g; BS 30.17). The Stoics contended that participation in political life was an appropriate activity for the wise (D.L. 6, 12):
however, this commitment to politics did not mean an unconditional acceptance of positive political norms, as these would be placed within the category of “indifferents” (Husson 2009, 128-129). Thus, for Zeno, the
majority of the rules that governed society during his time were what he considered “dispreferred indifferents”. Consequently, all those who were not virtuous, i.e. those he dubbed “abhorrent”, “enemies”, “slaves” and
“estranged from one another” were entirely incapable of building a genuine community of citizens (Philodemus, On the Stoics, 20, 4-24).
(3) Women are to be shared. This thesis is demonstrably Platonic (Republic, 5, 457c-d), although it was also upheld by Diogenes of Sinope, also known as Diogenes “the Dog” (ho kuôn) or “the Cynic” (ho kunikos) (D.L. 6, 72). “They hold that wives should be held in common (koinas) among the wise, so that anyone might have intercourse with any woman, as Zeno says in the Republic and Chrysippus in On the Republic, as well as Diogenes the Cynic and Plato.” (D.L. 7, 131; transl. Mensch 2018, 824).
However, even if the concept of adultery was abolished, marriage was still permitted, although this had to remain compatible with the thesis that women and children were “shared”, or held in common (D.L. 7, 121; 7, 3;
Philodemus, On the Stoics,18, 17-18). Likewise, the Stoics permitted incest and freedom of sexual relations, as well as the use of force in sexual relations, and allowed women to instigate sexual encounters (Philodemus, 18, 20-26).
In contrast to conventional marriage, the purpose of which was procreation, sexual relations between adults had no relevance from a purely moral perspective. Such relations, which were based on mutual consent and designed to achieve sexual satisfaction, could be heterosexual or homosexual in nature and engaged in with both adolescents and adults (SVF 3, 743-756). Incest, like that between Jocasta and Oedipus (SVF 1, 256), was not considered morally reprehensible (Philodemus, 16, 29-17, 4). “And in his work On the Republic he [Chrysippus] says that one can have intercourse with one’s mother, one’s daughters, and one’s sons. He says the same thing right at the beginning of his work On Things Not Worth Choosing for Their Own Sake.” (D.L. 7, 189; transl. Mensch 2018, 824; SVF 3, 744; cf.
Origen, Contra Celsum, 4, 45, 16-33). All of the possible permutations were permitted within the context of the family: there was no condemnation of sexual relations with one’s sisters, mother or other female relatives, or even with one’s brothers or sons (Philodemus, 18, 20-23).
In the Stoic city, love is free (Philodemus,19, 5-12): no one is married and no one is single, strictly speaking, as the concept of “sexual communality”
predominates and sexual relations do not imply the existence of matrimonial bonds. In this respect, as in the Cynic city built in accordance
with the laws of nature, there are no slaves, as there is no social stratification (Philodemus, 19, 6-13; cf. López Cruces 2017, 558). Further to the above, there exists a valuable testimony in which Zeno roundly opposes the notion of adultery, based on the argument that, if a rational married man sleeps with a woman who is legally married to another man, this would break up the woman’s (or more specifically, her husband’s) family and go against both society and nature (Origen, Contra Celsum, 7, 63, 12-18; SVF 3, 729). As such, it would be difficult to defend adultery in the Stoic city (cf. Bees 2011,142-148), given that adultery would destroy the principles of friendship (philia) and concord (homonoia) that had to preside over the republic, according to Zeno, and would go against both community (koinônia) and nature (phusis) (cf. Boeri and Salles 2014, 747).
But how could it be possible for Stoic wise men, the only true citizens, to commit adultery if they believed women should be shared? As in Plato, but also in contrast to Plato, sexual freedom entailed the “sharing” of women and children (D.L. 6, 72; Philodemus,18, 17-18). Adopting an even more radical perspective than the guardians of Plato’s Republic, the Stoic view of women and children, in line with the Cynics’ approach, was based on the notion of an ascetic community that rejected the conventional practices of the Athenian society of the time and proposed the elimination of gender- based discrimination. In Zeno’s Republic there is no class-based distinction, i.e. no differentiation between rulers, guardians and producers: rather, there is a complete absence of difference, and “no minority ruling class”
(Long and Sedley 1987, 435). Moreover, as children are “shared” or held in common, there is no private property, as everything belongs to everyone.
To build the Stoic city, Zeno suggests, one should eschew notions of kinship and social position and instead return to nature, seeking freedom and self-sufficiency through the exercising of virtue.
(4) In the cities there should be no temples, courts or gymnasiums. This theory, which proposes the dissolution of religious, legal and educational/training-oriented institutions, may be interpreted as the Zenonian version of the Platonic idea that there should be no litigation between guardians, and therefore the court system can be eliminated (cf.Schofield 1999a, 757-758). Nor does the city need to be beautified with temples and monuments: rather, it should be embellished by the virtues of its inhabitants, given that no monument is a creation worthy of the gods.
“It is a doctrine of Zeno's not to build temples of the gods (hieratheôn); for a temple not worth much is also not sacred, and nothing made by builders or
workmen is worth much.” (Plutarch, De Stoicorum repugnantiis, 1034b =SVF 1, 264; LS 67C; transl. Long and Sedley 1987, 430; cf. SVF 1, 265).
Notwithstanding the above, from another perspective the prohibition on the building of temples, courts and gymnasiums could also be interpreted as a reaction, on the part of the Stoic Zeno, against certain recommendations made by Plato in the Laws (755a; 771a; 778c; cf. Chroust 1965, 179, n. 22).
(5) Money must be abolished, as it serves no purpose either for exchange or for travel. This thesis is related to the maxim of Diogenes the Cynic and his “counterfeiting of money” (paracharattein) (D.L. 6, 20, 21, 56, 71), a practice which, as well as denoting the opposition between nomos and phusis, also takes on a symbolic meaning for the Cynic movement (cf.
Goulet-Cazé 1992; 1999, 703-704, n. 5; Casadesús Bordoy 2007): Diogenes counterfeited not only the morality, but also the religious, political and even philosophical institutions of his time. Consequently, he proposed the counterfeiting of the customs – nomisma means both “money” and
“traditions” – as well as the values of the city, in order to replace them with new ones. Thus, as an alternative to commerce based on monetary exchange, the Cynics suggested that knuckle bones (literally bones from sheep and goats) be used instead (Philodemus,16, 4-9).
A significant element of Stoicism involves the attempt to tame the Cynicism-inspired proposals put forward by Diogenes, who enables the chain of teachers and pupils to be traced from the Stoa all the way to the agora of Socrates. For Goulet-Cazé (2001, 212), the practice of Cynicism is characterised by “a bodily asceticism with a spiritual purpose”. Effectively, Diogenes’s “rhetoric of the body”, which served as the cornerstone of the
“invention” of Cynicism, was based on debasing the currency of the time (cf. Branham 1994).
(6) Men and women must wear the same clothes and display their naked bodies (Philodemus,19, 12-14 and 17-22). This theoria refers to the famous threadbare robes (tribôn) of the Cynics. According to Antipater of Sidon, Hipparchia of Maroneia (fl. ca. 336 BCE), the wife of Crates, renounced the external accoutrements that typified conventional women and chose to adopt the characteristic robe and sack of the Cynics (Anthologia Palatina,7, 413; cf. Zamora Calvo 2018). She also distanced herself entirely from the activities that were traditionally assigned to women in Ancient Greece (D.L. 6, 97), thereby demonstrating her capacity and standing as a female
philosopher who preferred to dedicate herself to education and intellectual pursuits instead of working a loom (D.L. 6, 98).
In terms of social roles and division of labour, the Stoic Politeia advocated equality between men and women. The Stoics believed that women should perform the same activities as men (Philodemus, 19, 13-17), and should have the same freedom to instigate sexual relations. Indeed, within the Stoa,Eros performed a political function. Athenaeus states that, according to Poncianus, Zeno believed Eros was a god of friendship that played a preparatory role for the achievement of concord. “Poncianus said that Zeno of Citium regarded Eros as god of friendship and freedom (philias kai eleutherias), and the provider in addition of concord (homonoias), but of nothing else. Hence in the Republic Zeno said: 'Eros is a god which contributes to the city's security (sôtêrian).'” (Athenaeus, Deipno sophistae, 561c = SVF 1, 263; BS 30.33; LS 67D; transl. Long and Sedley 1987, 430).
The Politeia that Zeno designed, on a foundation of Cynic principles and centred on a philosophy of bodily asceticism, corresponds to a kind of
“anti-city” (López Cruces 2017, 547). Moreover, Zeno took from the Cynics (specifically Antisthenes) the thesis that true friendship and reciprocal understanding can only be forged between those who are virtuous or wise (D.L. 6, 12). Cassius the Skeptic and some of the others in his circle criticised Zeno on the basis that, if only the virtuous can be considered citizens, then parents, children, friends and relatives must all be one another’s enemies, owing to the fact that they are not wise, or at least they are not necessarily wise (D.L. 7, 187-189; Sextus Empiricus, Adversus mathematios, 11, 190-194; Pyrrhonianae hypotyposeis, 3, 245-248;cf. Schofield 1991, 3-21; Goulet 1999, 811, n. 5). Only those who are virtuous are capable of establishing social relationships in the strictest sense. Viewed from this perspective, social relationships presuppose a state of harmony with one’s fellow human beings; however, for this to be possible, one must possess a correctly developed rationality, which will then enable the forging of genuine relationships of friendship (philia) and concord (homonoia), which themselves constitute the necessary and sufficient conditions for the creation of an authentic political community of a philosophical nature.
Therefore, only the virtuous are citizens of the Stoic politeia, as only they are able to form and maintain a genuine community (koinônia) in which the interests of the individual are no different to the interests of the collective.
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HUMAN MANTIC ART AND DIVINE MANTIC ART.
IAMBLICHUS’ CRITICISM ON DIVINATION COMMON FORMS
Adriana NEACȘU1
Abstract: Concerned with an ethical and ontological model of man aimed at his fulfilment in divine perfection, Iamblichus criticizes the principal human forms of divination, in order to describe, as opposed to them, the authentic form of divination, namely sacred or divine divination. Its principle is the following: the knowledge of the cause and essence of becoming leads us to the knowledge of the future. The ability to make predictions about the future is only granted to the gods, because they have a universal knowledge, but the gods offer their power to men that are capable to participate in the divine. This sacred divination occurs only in theurgy, which ultimate goal is the union of the theurgist with divinity, and the authentic divination is the crowning of the theurgy.
Keywords: human divination, sacred divination, signs of the gods, natural intuition, divine enthusiasm, divine dreams, theophoria, divination by oracles, divination by light, theurgy.
I. Introductory Remarks
The future has always exercised undeniable fascination on people who have developed in time many ways trying to know what is going to happen before it really happened. Particularly, antiquity seems to be the time when the means of predicting future varied a lot and enjoyed high appreciation not only in ordinary life, but also in the state one, determining the latter to confer them an institutionalized status. As it concerns the Greco-Roman philosophers, have not paid any attention to divinatory practices for quite a long time since they did not believe that they are closely linked to philosophy. The exception was made by the Stoics, due to their view on destiny (lat. fatum, gr. εἱμαρμένη), who believed in a universal determinism whose mechanism could be known through various divinatory practices. Still, Cicero in his book De divination, clearly argued against.
1 University of Craiova, Romania.
Yet, the context has changed dramatically starting with the first centuries after Christ, when the influence of the Oriental religions has become so powerful throughout the Roman Empire and when philosophers became irresistibly attracted by the opportunity to combine reason with the irrational in their thinking. Those who have illustrated this tendency greatly in their works were the Neo-Platonic philosophers after Plotinus, starting with Porphyry, and especially Iamblichus.
The latter, in The Mysteries of Egypt (gr. Περὶ τῶν αἰγυπτίων μυστηρίων, lat. De mysteriis)2 strives to systematically reject the doubts which Porphyry expressed in the Letter to Anébon on the ritualistic cult of gods as a way to raise the soul to divine. Iamblichus’ purpose is to justify theurgy (gr. θεουργία) from a philosophical point of view and means, being conceived as a complex system made out of a set of practices based on a divine and very accurate science, as a high level of spirituality (acquired in a philosophical manner), and as an exemplary ethical behaviour. In this context, Iamblichus states that the highest practice, crowning theurgy by enabling it to reach its end, is the art of divination (gr. μαντική τέχνη).
In order to give credibility to this very special status of divination he had to reverse the usual conception of the nature of divination and criticize the way it was practiced in most of its traditional forms. Thus, Iamblichus argues that there are two types of mantic (gr. μαντεία or ἡ μαντική ) or divination (lat. divinatio): one is human and the other one is divine.
II. Human mantic
Human mantic (ἀνθρώπινα μαντεία) knows many forms, which abut to the various results in the efforts to know (πρόγνωσις) the future (τὸ μέλλον). In his book, Iamblichus does not illustrate all these forms, but only the most important or most common, those that express their main categories. The first category is represented by the observation of the entrails of sacrificed animals (ἱεροσκοπία), the flight of birds (ὀρνιθομαντεία) and the movements of celestial bodies (ἀστρομαντεία).
To all these practices, Iamblichus confers a certain type of credibility,
2 The full title of Iamblichus’ book, established by Marsilio Ficino in the XVth century, is the following: De mysteriis Aegyptiorum Chaldaeorum Assyriorum.
since he managed to establish a connection between them and the divine will (βούλησις).
For example, the examination of entrails sometimes reveals a lack of various internal parts of the body without which life (ζωή) is not possible; the flight of birds, and particularly their strange behaviour are mainly directed by gods (θεοί); at last, star movements are entirely subordinated to the will of gods, and men can interpret them if they pay enough attention to the sky (οὐρανόσ), and thus guess some of the future events.
The general explanation for all this success of human divination is that gods use all natural phenomena and all beings (τὰ ὄντα) that live on land send signs (σημεῖα) to men helping them figure out in a greater or lesser degree of probability the future. The divine signs are everywhere (περὶ πάντα τὸν κόσμον), not only in the three types of objects mentioned above, but even in the most simple and humble things of the world, as ”little pebbles, rods, or certain woods, stones, wheat, and barley meal”3, thus, expressing any other ways in which human mantic can be exercised.
DM. III, 15
...the mode of divination, accomplished by human skill (...) uses certain divine signs that have been perfected by the gods in various ways. From divine signs, in virtue of the relationship of things to the signs shown, the technique somehow draws conclusions and guesses at the divination, inferring it from certain probabilities. The gods produce the signs by means of nature, which is subservient to them for the creation of each thing, both universal and particular, or through the agency of daemons concerned with creation, who, presiding over the elements of the universe and individual bodies, indeed over all living being in the cosmos, guide the phenomena with ease in a manner pleasing to the gods.
They reveal through symbols the purpose of the gods, even giving advance notice of the future. (tr. Clarke, Dillon, Hershbell) 4
…τέχνης ἀντρωπίνη ἐπιτελούμενον τρόπον (…) σημείοις τισὶ τοῦτο ϑείοις χρῆται ἐκ ϑεῶν ἐπιτελουμένοις κατὰ ποικίλους. Ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν ϑείων τεκμηρίων κατὰ τὴν συγγένειαν τῶν πραγμάτων πρὸς τὰ δεικνύμενα σημεῖα συμβάλλει πως ἡ τέχνη καὶ στοχάζεται τὴν μαντείαν, ἐξ εἰκότων τινῶν αὐτὴν
3 Clarke, E.C., Dillon, J., Hershbell, J., ed. and trans. 2003. Iamblichus, De Mysteriis. III 17. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature. 163.
4 Clarke (2003) 157.
συλλογιζομένη. Τὰ μὲν οὖν σημεῖα οἱ ϑεοὶ ποιοῦσι διὰ τῆς φύσεως τῆς δουλευούσης αὐτοῖς πρὸς τὴν γένεσιν, τῆς τε κοινῆς καὶ τῆς ἰδίας ἑκάστων, ἢ διὰ τῶν γενεσιουργῶν δαιμόνων οἵτινες τοῖς στοιχείοις τοῦ παντὸς καὶ τοῖς μερικοῖς σώμασι ζῴοις τε καὶ τοῖς ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ πᾶσιν ἐπιβεβηκότες ἄγουσι τὰ φαινόμενα μετὰ ῥᾳστώνης ὅπῃπερ ἂν δοκῇ τεοῖς. Συμβολικῶς δὲ τὴν γνώμην τοῦ ϑεοῦ ἐμφαίνουσι, καὶ τὴν τοῦ μέλλοντος προδήλωσιν. (135.1 – 136.2)
This type of mantic that uses the signs of gods, perceived by various intermediaries, can get more or less significant results based on the human ability to interpret the signs or symbols (σύμβολα), without reaching yet this way, real knowledge (γνῶσις), the only one that guarantees a correct prediction (ἀψευδής), doubtless, of the future. But it expresses the best performance that can reach the human mantic. All the others that appeal exclusively to men’s mental and intellectual faculties most get to relative, uncertain, doubtful, if not false and mystifying results. For example, there is a human science to predict the future in the art of navigation (κυβερνητική τέχνη) and medicine (ἰατρική τέχνη) of which specialists can anticipate the evolution of the uncertain period of illness (νόσημα) or cure, given the fact that they make analogies and inferences in the light of the knowledge given by their profession and their previous experience. We will not interpret the signs of gods below, but only ”read” the signs of nature (φύσις) or the body (σῶμα) and these predictions are always quite problematic, since they are not based on real knowledge, of their causes (αἰτίαι).
DM. III, 26
Hence, not even if there is, in the arts and crafts (for example, in piloting a ship, or medicine), some degree of knowledge that grasps the future, it is not at all like divine foreknowledge. For the former calculates the future from probabilities and estimates by certain signs, and these are not always trustworthy, nor, in like manner, do they have what is signified properly connected with that of which the signs are evidence. But divine foreknowledge of future events is directed by a firm knowledge, and an unshakeable assurance deriving from the causes, an indissoluble comprehension connecting all things to all, and in the same manner, a power of an always abiding discernment of all things as present and determinate. (tr. Clarke, Dillon, Hershbell) 5
…ὅϑεν δὴ οὐδ’ εἴ τίς ἐστιν ἐν ταῖς τέχναις, ὥσπερ ἐν κυβερνητικῇ τε καὶ ἰατρικῇ, προσκοποῦσα τὸ μέλλον μάϑησις, οὐδὲν προσήκει τῇ ϑείᾳ προγνώσει·
5 Clarke (2003) 185.
ἐξ εἰκότων γὰρ ἀναλογίζεται τὸ μέλλον καὶ σημείοις τισὶ τεκμηριοῦται καὶ τούτοις οὐκ ἀεὶ πιστοῖς οὐδ’ ὡσαύτως συνηρτημένον ἔχουσι τὸ δηλούμενον, οὗπέρ ἐστι τὰ σημεῖα δείγματα. Της δὴ ϑείας προνοίας τῶν ἐσομένων βέβαιος ἡ εἴδησις προηγεῖται, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν αἰτίων ἀμετάπτωτος ἡ πίστωσις, συνηρτημένη τε πάντων πρὸς ἅπαντα ἀδιαλύτως κατάληψις, καὶ ὡσαύτως ἀεὶ μένουσα τῶν ὅλων ὥσπερ παρόντων καὶ ὡρισμένων διάγνωσις. (163.9 – 164.4)
Another humane method to know the future events is natural intuition (ἐπιβολή), which is a special quality innate to some individuals.
This is, in fact, a premonition or a presentiment related to natural perception of animals which, due to the acuity of their senses, can feel the changes that take place elsewhere of their place but that will produce soon the effects there.6 In any case, these premonitions do not express the human capacity to grasp the supposedly universal sympathy of things (συμπάθεια τοῦ παντὸς) that would allow them to send information between them. At most, they can seize in a dark way and by chance, signs or images of divine knowledge from which they borrow most of their divinatory performance. But these premonitions are blind, without precision and random, since the interpretation they give to the divine signs is confusing and thus reaches only some simulacra of the truth (φαντάσματα τοῦ ἀληθοῦς).7
It is therefore possible to achieve a human divination (τὸ μέλλον μάθησις), based on intuition, analogy (ἀναλογία) and probability, on the capacity to evaluate, estimation and deduction from a given situation and using various knowledge obtained above, but it has no precision.
Still, despite their great imperfections, these forms of human mantic mentioned above are able to anticipate to a certain degree future events.
But there are others which mislead people by offering them false forecasts. They have no real cognitive basis but they are misleading and entirely harmful. Iamblichus asserts that they are “falsehoods”
(ψευδολογίαι) made by impostors, who want to convince us that they are into relations with the gods, but are not able to learn and practice the art of contact with them, that is theurgy.
DM. III, 13
However, because of those who put it to bad use, it is not easy to do justice to this form of divination in a single account. But that which is readily accessible
6 Clarke (2003) 185. Iamblichus, DM. III, 26.
7 Clarke (2003) 185-187. Iamblichus, DM. III, 27.
and widespread among the vulgar throng, employing falsehood and deceit of an intolerable nature, enjoys the presence of no god, but produces a certain motion of the soul, contrary to the gods, and draws from them an indistinct and phantom-like appearance which sometimes, because of the feebleness of its power, is likely to be disturbed by evil daemonic influences. (…) For there are some who overlook the whole procedure of effective contemplation, both in regard to the one who makes an invocation and the one who enjoys the vision;
and they disdain the order of the sacred observance, its holiness and long- protracted endurance of toils, and, rejecting the customs, prayers and other rituals, they believe the simple standing on the characters to be sufficient, and when they have done this for a mere hour, they believe that they have caused some spirit to enter. And yet how could anything noble or perfect result from this? (tr. Clarke, Dillon, Hershbell)8
Τοῦτο τοίνυν διὰ τοὺς κακῶς αὐτῷ χρωμένους οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἐν ἑνὶ λόγῳ περιλαβεῖν. ᾿Αλλὰ τὸ μὲν πρόχειρον καὶ κακῶς ἐπιπολᾴζον ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνϑρώποις ψευδολογίᾳ τε καὶ ἀπάτῃ χρώμενον οὐκ ἀνεκτῇ, οὐδ᾿ ὅλως ἔχει τινὸς ϑεοῦ παρουσίαν, κίνησιν δέ τινα τῆς ψυχῆς ποιεῖται παρὰ τοὺς ϑεούς, καὶ ἀμυδράν τινα ἀπ’ αὐτῶν εἰδωλικὴν ἔμφασιν ἕλκει, ἥτις διὰ τὸ ἐξίτηλον τῆς δυνάμεως εἴωδεν ἐνίοτε ὑπὸ τῶν δαιμονίων φαύλων ἐπιταράττεσται (…) Εἰσὶ γάρ τινες οἳ ὅλην πραγματείαν τῆς τελεσιουργοῦ ϑεωρίας παριδόντες περί τε τὸν καλοῦντα καὶ περὶ τὸν ἐπόπτην, τάξιν τε τῆς ϑρησκείας καὶ τὴν ὁσιωτάτην ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ τῶν πόνων ἐμμονὴν ἀτιμάσαντες, ϑεσμούς τε καὶ ἐντυχίας καὶ ἄλλας ἁγιστείας παρωσάμενοι, ἀποχρῶσαν νομίζουσι τὴν ἐπὶ τῶν χαρακτήρων μόνην στάσιν, καὶ ταύτην ἐν μιᾷ ὥρᾳ ποιησάμενοι, εἰσκρίνειν νομίζουσί τι πνεῦμα· καίτοι τί ἂν γένοιτο ἀπὸ τούτων καλὸν ἢ τέλειον; (129.14 –131.11)
The dreams (ὄνειροι) that we have during our sleep (ὕπνος) are also misleading (ψευδεῖς) and harmful, although they are considered by the crowd, due to the virtue of their ignorance (ἄγνοια) as dreams sent by gods to reveal the future. But in reality, these dreams arise from the limited capacity of the human soul (ψυχή), since they are simply echoes of our diurnal activity, desires, concerns, which are offered as a raw material to our imagination (τὸ φανταςτικὸν) that plays with them as it pleases. Moreover, these dreams let us know about the future occasionally, only by chance, most of the time they are misleading.9
These two forms of divination, although they are realized through human powers, pretend to appeal to gods. But there are others who
8 Clarke (2003) 151-153.
9 Clarke (2003) 121-123. Iamblichus, DM. III, 2.
endow them a real power to know the future without any help from gods, or even have the illusion of subordinating divine forces to them. In this sense, Iamblichus illustrates several points of view mentioned by Porphyry in his Letter to Anébon, that highlight some capabilities of our soul and our body which can play the role of real causes for an efficient human divination. But as for Iamblichus, he aims to reject all these points of view as really inconsistent.
For example, one of these theoretical positions asserts that the human soul can successfully achieve an activity of divination when it is captured by passions that trouble and set it in movement, forcing it to get out of itself, transporting it in ecstasy (ἔκστασις) or ”divine” delirium (θεῖας παράλλαξις) to see acutely the future events. Passions can be triggered by various sounds and melodies, by dance movements but also by other physical means able to touch and influence the soul.10 But Iamblichus argues that passion (πάθος) is a lower faculty compared to the intellect (νοῦς) and reason (διάνοια), so its performance is inferior to the results of these; moreover, the passion cannot reach the future, because it remains always in the present (ἐν τῷ παρόντι).
DM. III, 24
Or why is the soul, once of sound reason and constant in accord with its better powers, those of mind and understanding, ignorant of what is to be, but wen experiencing disorderly and turbulent motions manages to hit upon the future? For why should emotion be suitable for the contemplation of real beings? Why is this not rather a hindrance to genuine observation? Moreover, if the things in the cosmos were constituted by passions, then something like the passions would have a certain affinity with them; but if they are established by rational principles and forms, the foreknowledge of them will be something different, remote from every passion. Moreover, passion perceives only the present and what already exists, but foreknowledge apprehends things that do not yet exist. Foreknowledge, then, is something other than experiencing passion.(tr. Clarke, Dillon, Hershbell) 11
…ἢ τί δήποτε σωφρονοῦσα μὲν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ ἄτρεπτος οὖσα κατὰ τὰς βελτίονας ἑαυτῆς δυνάμεις τὰς νοερὰς διανοητικὰς ἀγνοεῖ τὸ ἐσόμενον, πάσχουσα δὲ κατὰ τὰς ἀτάκτους καὶ ταραχώδεις κινήσεις ἐπιβάλλει τῷ μέλλοντι; τί γὰρ δήποτε καὶ ἔχει τὸ πάϑος οἰκεῖον εἰς τὴν ϑεωρίαν τῶν ὄντων;
10 Clarke (2003) 139-141. Iamblichus, DM. III, 9.
11 Clarke (2003) 179.
