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C C U U P P R R I I N N S S

POLITICAL HISTORY: THOUGHT AND PRACTICE

Emanuel COPILAŞ, The ‘patriotic guards’ and the ‘popular war doctrine’. On the ideological scaffolding of Socialist Romania’s security policy 7 Mihaela Camelia BUZATU, The adherence of national minorities to the

National Renaissance Front 21

Adi Horatiu SCHWARZ, The Jewish Question - a particular political issue in

modern Romania 27

POLITICS TODAY: HOW TO DEAL WITH THE RECENT ISSUES?

Cătălina Maria GEORGESCU, Does the position make the difference?

Measuring perceptions on politicization, corruption and control among civil servants in public positions of leadership and execution

36

Alexandru VOLACU, Uncertainty and the logic of imperfect ideological

integration 50

Andreea NIŢĂ, Cultural phenomena and processes in contemporary society –

determinants of cultural policies 61

Laura Elena MARINAŞ, Mihai Ovidiu CERCEL, The Role of Pre-Accession Non-Reimbursable Funds in Preparing the Access to and the Absorption of Non-Reimbursable Assistance of the 2007-2013

70

Cristina ILIE GOGA, Policy of the Spanish state regarding immigration. Free

movement of Romanian workers restricted in Spain 79

Roxana Maria PÎRVU, The impact of the world financial crisis on the

fulfilment of the convergence criteria 87

Silviu Dorin GEORGESCU, Model of Analysis of Influencing Factors on the

Romanian Postal and Courier Services 104

JUSTICE AND INTITUTIONAL REFORM: PATHS TO EU INTEGRATION George Liviu GÎRLEŞTEANU, The National Integrity Agency - autonomous

administrative authority 113

Irina Olivia CĂLINESCU, Protection of right of property in the view of Civil

Code with regard to ECHR case-law 124

Lavinia Elena SMARANDACHE, Credit institutions from the perspective of the

National Bank of Romania’s contribution to the publicity of the banking law 130 Livia DUMITRESCU, The evolution of the criminal judicial cooperation in the

European Union 141

Oana Maria BĂLAN, The interpretive law, between the different meanings

given by pedants and the abusive legislator’s intervention in jurisdictional 157 Gabriela ALEXANDROIU, Preliminary ruling, the means of interpretation of

Community law 163

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Revista de Ştiinţe Politice. Revue des Sciences Politiques • No. 32 • 2011

POLITICS & RELIGION: BUILDING UNITY WITHIN DIVERSITY

Anca Parmena OLIMID, Understanding EU Conditionnality: A Conceptual Framework of National Sovereignty and Religious Freedom (Romania case study)

169

Raymond CANNING, Culture or Faith? Origins of Conflict in our Society. A

Catholic Perspective 180

Robert W. HEFNER, Asian and Middle Eastern Islam 188 Gelu CĂLINA, The Disputes between Roman-Catholics and the

Anticlerical movement in France during the XVIII-XIX centuries 197 Raluca DIMA, The European Union and transnational religion 204 B O O K R E V I E W

Anca Parmena Olimid, Istoria gândirii politice. Libertatea şi laicitatea în

spaţiul public european (secolele XIX-XXI) (Aurel PIŢURCĂ) 217

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ORIGINAL PAPER Emanuel COPILAŞ

The ‘patriotic guards’ and the ‘popular war doctrine’. On the ideological scaffolding of

Socialist Romania’s security policy

Emanuel COPILAŞ, West University of Timişoara,

Faculty of Political Sciences, Philosophy and Communication Sciences Department of Political Sciences

E-mail: [email protected]

Abstract: „Prague spring”, or, in other words, Moscow’s intolerance for political and economical reforms challenging the communist monopoly in the „brotherly countries”, posed a considerable influence on the security policy of socialist Romania. It even led to major reinterpretations and reorganizations of the existent strategic conceptions. Accordingly, the „popular guards” were once again put in place, and the doctrine of „popular war” came to light. The constitutive extent in which these concepts were penetrated by the romantic-Leninist ideology constitutes the object of the present paper.

Key words: romantic-Leninism, strategic thinking, „patriotic guards”, „popular war”, Warsaw Treaty.

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Outlining romantic Leninism

I have chosen to conceptualize the ideological structure of Romanian communism during the ‘Ceaușescu era’ under the name of romantic Leninism.

An unusual mélange between different ideological extremes, romantic Leninism enters the stage once Gheorghe Gheorghiu Dej’s young successor, Nicolae Ceaușescu, achieves and consolidates power. But romantic Leninism is much more than Ceaușescu’s thinking, despise the fact the latter represented the primary source which fueled it - reflecting a multitude of social tendencies, mentalities, bureaucratic inertias and ideological fidelities. The Leninist component of romantic Leninism is characterized by its permanent projective orientation in the sense of overcoming the ‘bourgeois’ world trough massive industrialization, considered to be validated by historic laws and, in general, trough intransigent attitude, ‘revolutionary vigilance’, oriented against any political or ideological shortcomings or ‘deviations’. The romantic component, on the other hand, includes the cult of heroism, exacerbated nationalist flares against all inside minorities, respectively for international affirmation, externally, the hypertrophyation of the party in relation to its leader, the general secretary of the Central Committee, a fascistic evolution, because only in fascist regimes the most important depository of legitimacy is the leader, not the party – and, in general, the importance accorded to the nation, a concept which the Romanian communists tried to ideologically aseptize trough, among others, a substantial contribution to the creation of a ‘new international order’. Leninism, romanticism, nationalism and fascism, paradoxically, but functionally, coexist inside this species of Leninism and confer it an unique identity, formed both by positivist elements, with an exacerbated modernity (Leninism), and form premodern elements (romanticism and nationalism). On short, a paramodern identity, which the regime tried to impose the society until its very last second of existence, hoping and acting trough any means possible to ideologically enroll an essentially hostile population and therefore ‘counter-revolutionary’.¹

The consequences of the ‘Prague spring’ in Romania. Ideological and security aspects

‘We have decided that, starting today, to begin the formation of armed patriotic guards, made of workers, peasants and intellectuals, defenders of the independence of our socialist homeland’- Ceaușescu ranted in front of the people gathered in 21 August to listen about the position of the Romanian leadership regarding the events in Czechoslovakia. ‘We want our people to have its own armed units to protect its revolutionary conquests, to ensure its peaceful work, the independence and security of the socialist homeland’.² Moreover, after two days, on a military parade, the ‘patriotic guards’ ostentatiously marched in front of the Soviet embassy.³ 520 000 soldiers, ‘including the active reserves’, and ‘700 000 members of the patriotic guards’ could have been mobilized by the end of 1968 by the Romanian Communist Party (RCP).⁴ Ceaușescu intended to transmit a clear signal to Moscow, namely that he will continue to firmly defend its position as a supporter of Czechoslovak reforms and as an accuser of the

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Warsaw Treaty Organization’s (WTO) military intervention in that ‘brotherly country’, under the Soviet aegis; Romanian Socialist Republic’s (RSR) defiant attitude will come to an end several days later, when, as we are about to see, the Soviet ambassador in Bucharest will deliver a clear message to the impetuous Romanian leader from the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The ‘patriotic guards’, however, were not founded in 1968 during those turbulent circumstances – when Romania was not as endangered by a potential Warsaw Treaty intervention as it is usually considered; they had a much longer history. Even before 23 August 1933 these guards were constituted as ‘shock brigades’ trough which the communists had presumably prepared the

‘armed insurrection’ against the Antonescu government. In reality, the ‘patriotic guards’ were paramilitary formations that terrorized the population and the state institutions to create confusion and discouragement, vital ingredients for the communist takeover. Composed ‘in a large extent by the most advanced and determined workers in the fight against fascism, communist, communist youth and party-less workers’, the ‘guards’, commanded in those days by Emil Bodnăraș, were secondated by ‘groups of patriots with local missions, which trough sabotages and agitation had to a general confusion in the fascist state apparatus’.⁵ The shock groups played, apparently, a considerable role in bringing under control the public institutions and the population in general. Together with the army, ‘which turned its weapons against the Hitlerite occupants’ and the ‘masses of workers and peasants’, the guards ‘created that revolutionary force which gave a large popular character the armed insurrection and ensured the conditions to reach victory’.⁶ The 23 august ‘victory’, to be precise; however the guards also had a notable contribution to the installment of the regime, by being maintained ‘in cities and even in some villages’ as forms of ‘citizen control against speculators, thieves and other delinquents’.⁷

Being established and abolished after the regime’s liking, the guard gradually loosed their general utility as post-revolutionary Leninism⁸ replaced successfully the ‘bourgeois’ organization of the Romanian society. They were reactivated in 1956, once the Hungarian revolution broke up, but they gradually slipped into obscurity after the retreat of the Soviet army, two years later, and finally ceased their activity in 1962. During Gheorghe Gheorghiu Dej’s leadership, these groups were officially named ‘fighting formations of the people’. Only in 1968, when, due to Ceaușescu’s insecurity, they were permanently reinstalled, they became ‘patriotic guards’.⁹ The new denomination reflects the nationalist surplus of the new leadership. Furthermore, trough the permanentization of those specific guards we can partially understand the integrative tendencies of romantic Leninism in relation to the society, much more pronounced than that of autonomous post-revolutionary Leninism (Romanian communist ideology during the Gheorghiu-Dej regime).

The reconstitution of these formations begun immediately after Ceaușescu’s speech in the palace market. Benefiting, at least in that period, of popular adherence, the guards reached impressive numbers. Only in Timiș county (the territorial-administrative reorganization took place in February)

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they summed up about 15 000 members, assigned as it follows: in Timișoara, Lugoj and Jimbolia were created 79 guards including 4284 members, and in communes (implicitly in villages too) existed 169 formation like these, including 10599 members.¹⁰ We can therefore build up a general image regarding the national number of ‘patriotic guards’. Most importantly, in those moments, the RCP could count, in case of an improbable external aggression, on the vast majority of their members. One cannot say the same however in the 1970s and 1980s, when the regime had for long lost popular enthusiasm, in which’s inertia still continued to imagine itself.

As romantic Leninism became progressively isolated, both internally and externally, and therefore less and less capable of putting into practice its communist inter-national project (of uniting all ‘anti-imperialist’ and ‘anti- colonial’ forces in the effort to bring about a ‘new international order’) – the role of ‘patriotic guards’ as ‘socialist conscience’ and ‘revolutionary patriotism’

promoters amplifies.¹¹ So does the romanticism specific to this type of Leninism, in which fascist tones are recognizable. Regardless of the organizations they were enrolled in, all citizens had the ‘primordial obligation’ ‘to be ready anytime to defend with abnegation, with the price of blood and life, the revolutionary conquest of the people, the sovereignty and national independence’. Mobilizing exhortation in the style of Nicolae Bălcescu are also present: ‘To be worthy of our ancestors, we are obliged to fulfill their dream of making the homeland more and more flourishing, to lift it on new peaks of civilization, so as to shine forever between the countries of the world’.¹²

Both during an armed conflict, and during peacetime, the ‘fighter’ from the ‘patriotic guards’ had to obey first of all the legislation in force. Build after Leninist patterns, this would have constituted and indispensable action guide for the combatant. ‘«Socialism cannot be build trough disobeying laws, trough anarchy!»’ Ceaușescu vehemently stated. ‘«This represents a bourgeois and small-bourgeois mentality and spirit, foreign to the working class which, through its essence, is a disciplined, revolutionary class!»’.¹³ Moreover, discipline, alongside resistance, was considered the most important quality of the fighter;

its courage and ‘bravery’ had to be always subsumed to the party leadership, the only force entitled to build ‘socialism’.¹⁴ Next, the members of the ‘patriotic guards’ had the duty to ‘vigilantly’ protect ‘the revolutionary conquests of the people’, especially against internal enemies, which’s actions were always supported, material or only ideological, by foreign enemies. The filiation between romantic and post-revolutionary Leninism is clear in this point.

Therefore, because ‘in a form or another, remains of old habits, attitudes and conceptions alimented by a series of bourgeois influences from outside still persist in the conscience of some of the society’s members’, the guards members had to identify and ‘combat’ the ‘corrupt elements’, instrumented by

‘reactionaries’ and by ‘imperialists’, nothing more than ‘remains of the former exploiting classes’ or ‘declassed individuals, hungry for laziness and ease, creatures free of the most elementary moral norms, willing to sell their homeland, to betray the country in which they were born and grew up in order

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to satisfy their own petty personal interests’. These were categorically condemned by the RCP’s general secretary: ‘«for a handful of silver, they betray their homeland».¹⁵ Using biblical metaphors to accuse the society’s lack of adherence towards the revolutionary project of the regime confirms the fact that its romanticism became more exacerbated as it lost the war with ‘bourgeois’

reality. Romantic Leninism was making its final, more and more absurd attempts to force the appearance of ‘revolutionary conscience’ for the society and an organic unity between it and the aspirations of Nicolae Ceaușescu, concomitant with the rejection of foreign influences, from now on inimical regardless their political and ideological provenience.

‘As part of socialist consciousness and of revolutionary patriotism, revolutionary vigilance does not constitute a conjunctural act, but a rule of conduct which must guide every working man, every military and patriotic guards fighter in any circumstances. For the citizens of our homeland there is no greater honor, no nobler and uplifting duty that to love and defend the socialist homeland. The high revolutionary conscience of our people, its ardent patriotism, the strict obeying of the country laws, the hatred towards those who attempt to violate its revolutionary conquests, its independence and national sovereignty, made it hard for the foreign information services to find fertile ground for their espionage activities. It is proven that a characteristic of our society is constituted by the monolithic unity between the people around the party, unity expressed in the determination with which all working people, regardless of nationality, work for the development of the economic power and defending capacity of the homeland’.¹⁶

The ‘patriotic guards’ were subordinated to the RCP and the army. Never being involved in an armed conflict, they were used for a multitude of functions which included: assisting the ‘Internal Ministry units’ or ‘border guard troops’, security and maintaining public order missions, but also helping in case of natural calamities, fires or major accidents that would have required their convocation.¹⁷ Enrollment in the ‘patriotic guards’ was voluntary. Of course, we are talking about the Leninist sense of voluntary; from a document of the Timiș County National Archives we can find out that, in the 23 of August 1968, the constitution of the new formations in the Timiș county communes was over.

Unsurprisingly, ‘no one refused to be a part of the patriotic guards’.¹⁸ The age limit, 60 years for men and 55 for women, could be exceeded on request. The minimum age to become a member of the ‘patriotic guards’ was 21 years, for both sexes. But the recruitment of ‘youth squads for defense purposes’ begun much earlier, from 16 years on.¹⁹ The young learned, under the army’s guide, detailed instruction programs on one to one combat, the use of different types of

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weapons and deriving advantages from the position and the resources of the field on which the rejection of the outside enemy would have taken place. The

‘youth training for defending the homeland’ manual, edited by the Ministry of National Defense, is highly concluding in this sense.²⁰

In case of war, the guards would have fought under the army’s command to defend the aggressor (The RSR would have fought only ‘just’, defensive wars) within the framework of a ‘popular war’ war ‘war of the entire people’ which, in Ceaușescu, would have obtained epic proportions. This would have meant a coordinated effort which the whole population, ‘young and old, men and women’

would have been obliged to fought for saving the ‘homeland’s independence’.

Now, the guard’s ‘fighting missions’ include the defending of different strategic objectives and the facilitation of logistic actions to stop the invader, but, occasionally, they can be also offensive. What is interesting is that, in order to ensure the combativity of the guards, these would have been located, in case of war, in the perimeters of the cities or villages where the fighters lived or were born.²¹ Here is how the national sentiment was induced and exploited not only

‘from above’, but also reversely, ‘from below’. The concept of ‘entire people’s war’ was not Ceaușescu’s invention, but a borrowing from the Yugoslav military doctrine. The popular war will be utilized also for undermining the security policy of the whole ‘socialist camp’, managed by the WTO. The RSR did not acquiesced to the ‘common defense’ desideratum this organization tried to impose, but, on the contrary, transformed the national security in a principial question incompatible with a superior referent.²² Romantic Leninism will vehemently affirm its dissidence at the military level; the army’s type of nationalism was blended with the one coming from the official ideology for an assault as efficient as possible over the ‘old’, the ‘small-bourgeois spirit’, which obstinately resisted the party’s propagandistic avalanche. The army’s main role will be diverted into an ‘agent for patriotic socialization’ which, under RCP’s leadership, will strive to create the ‘socialist conscience’ that was so necessary for the future ‘new man’.²³

Truly, as Jones and Alexiev observed, the RCP managed to successfully imprint its ‘ideological values’ to the Romanian military thinking, therefore military nationalism was combined almost perfectly with romantic Leninist nationalism.²⁴ ‘In the military field, the leadership is by excellence a political activity, due to the revolutionary character of the armed institutions, its role and functions in the society, its sacred mission’, and the whole activity of the army must be subsumed not only ideologically, but also organizationally, to the RCP.

The romantic-Leninist indoctrination was also a basic component of the army’s activity ‘all commanders, all cadres must understand that political, educational work it is not a specialty in our army, it is not the task f a distinct category of cadres, but a major attribution of all the cadres’.²⁵ Here are some of the characteristics that the ‘military cadres’ had to develop in order to serve the

‘homeland’ as good as possible: first of all, they had to attend to their ‘political and ideological culture’, respectively ‘the profound and multilateral understanding of the party’s policy, their arming with the revolutionary

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conception of the working class about the world and life – the profound knowledge of comrade’s Nicolae Ceaușescu’s work which represents the creative appliance of Marxism to the concrete conditions of our country’. Then, the military must have proved they had ‘ardent patriotism’ and cultivate their

‘revolutionary spirit’ and ‘militancy’; they also needed ‘to be animated by a developed sense of justice’, not to disobey ‘military dignity and honor’, to show their ‘high responsibility’ in work and to have the ‘courage of assuming responsibility’, to manifest ‘initiative spirit’, to permanently overflow with

‘unquenched passion in work’, ‘to serve as example for the subordinates’ and, last but not least, to have the ‘skill to mobilize and enliven the subordinates to the irreproachable fulfillment of duties’.²⁶ How can these principles not be compatible with romantic Leninist ideology when they represent nothing more than a vehement expression of it?

Moreover, how can military nationalism not be compatible with the romantic Leninist one when the latter integrally confiscated the former and instrumented it according to its own ideological logic? While the ‘bourgeois spirit’ penetrated more and more the communist world, the RSR’s military propaganda strived to inoculate the uniform wearers ‘the mixing of their own being to the goals and ideals of the party, a mixing expressed in an unreserved dedication to the relentless fulfillment of these goals and ideals’. Therefore, it was not just ‘the propagation and explanation of some conceptions, theses, qualities, virtues’, but an ‘authentic transformation of them in ideals and unshakable beliefs of the military, which to come to life in their attitudes and facts, in their way of thinking and living’.²⁷ As Alexiev properly underlines, the RCP ideologically articulated a new type of nationalism which can be described as ‘calculated policy to elicit support for broader party objectives and is used primarily as a mobilization tool’. But, Alexiev does not forget to add that, ‘in pursuing a nationalistic course, the party itself has undergone a process of resocialization in nationalistic values. This had, in turn, made it more receptive to intrinsic military values. A logical consequence of this process has been the party decision to restore the formerly downgraded military to its traditional position as repository of national ideals’.²⁸

Back to the ‘popular war’, we find out that, unlike classical wars in which

‘the fighting actions are carried out only or almost only by regular armed forces’, in the ‘popular war’ ‘act and play an important role the popular fighting formations (guerillas, partisans, patriotic guards, resistance formations etc.) which, according to the circumstances, can act independently or together with the regular army’.²⁹ A typology of this type of war, advanced in the last years of the regime, helps us understand better the manner in which romantic Leninism conceived its (in)security. In this way, the ‘popular war’ is not to be confounded with ‘defensive wars’ or ‘social liberation’ or national wars, although it undeniably encompasses elements of this kind. Although found in ‘capitalist’

states as well, the semantics of this kind of war is much more pronounced in Leninist regimes, where ‘it ensures the indissoluble blending between the patriotic and the revolutionary spirit in social and military action’. Furthermore,

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to be truly popular, a war necessitates ‘a mass, large participation’. Its fighting techniques are varied ‘in relation with the possibilities of the people, the nation, the social forces that support and wear it’; event if it is indicated that the adversary should not be ‘massacred’, eventually, this aspect depends on its behavior. Fighting against the enemies is without ‘restrictions or prejudices’; the invader must be rejected and the national being defended at any cost. Moreover,

‘the popular war is a long war’. Its extension reflects the population’s resisting capacities and the progressive erosion of the material and moral forces of the enemy. Nonetheless, this type of war ‘has its own fighting forms and techniques’, of which the most important is ‘the strong correlation of the social-political dimensions with the forms and procedures of armed fighting’ and it is also a

‘total war’ because ‘it assumes an engagement on all fields – military, political, ideological, economic, moral-psychological’ in order to successfully deal with the aggressor.³⁰ It was estimated by the military experts that approximately 50% of the population could be mobilized in case of such a conflict.³¹

The main component of the ‘popular war’ thus becomes visible:

ideological indoctrination.³² Romantic Leninism needed in the first place a faithful society, believing and acting for ‘building socialism’; in the eventuality of a conflict, its capacity to maintain power would have been seriously questioned, and the RCP’s leadership was undoubtedly aware of this aspect. The propaganda in favor of the regime, camouflaged to some extent in the form of ‘revolutionary socialist patriotism’, entered an exacerbation process as the society was furthering away from the regime, giving in the ‘bourgeois’ ideological temptations. The tendency is clearly confirmed by sociological studies done on Romanian mass-media from that period, which concluded that ‘the citizens’

preference for audio-visual mass-media placed political-patriotic-economic reports on embarrassing low positions – less important than any musical or entertaining program, than any sports, theater or cultural transmission, even than the weather bulletin’.³³

Farewell but not goodbye. Eluding the WTO policy

The internal field of RSS’s security policy is intertwined with the external one as much as the internal orientation of romantic Leninism is connected to the external one: the mobilizing and integrative totalitarianism with reference to the

‘socialist nation’ has its counterpart in the independence desideratum, be it military, political or economic.

Established in 1955 as a counterweight of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the WTO represented the military dimension of the

‘socialist camp’, instrumented of course by Moscow. In general, the WTO’s structure was made of the Political Consultative Committee, an organism which gathered twice a year to discuss pressing military issues, followed by a

‘permanent commission with the task of elaborating recommendations in foreign policy problems’ and a ‘united Secretariat’ which held representatives of the member countries.³⁴ In 1969, to these organisms was added a ‘military council’: the security of the ‘socialist camp’ needed to be redefined after the 1968

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events. The council had a consultative role and iti did not comprise representatives of the RSR.³⁵ Approximately in the same period, a political directorate’ is created, having the role of preventing the centrifugal tendencies of member countries tempted to adopt security strategies similar to Yugoslav or Romanian ones.³⁶

One of the main activities of WTO’s members consisted in joint military exercises. These were introduced by marshal Greciko n 1961, Cristopher Jones argues, ‘in order to prevent Romania to develop a territorial defensive system and to prevent other defense ministries of the WTO to follow the Albanian and Romanian examples and retreat their armed forces from the interior of Soviet control mechanisms’.³⁷ As we already know, Soviet troops were pulled out of Romania in 1968, and Albania and the Soviet Union ceased their diplomatic relations in 1961, when Enver Hodja vigorously took the Chinese side in the Sino-Soviet conflict.

Consonant with its new foreign policy launched at the beginning of the 1960s, Bucharest did not allow Soviet troops to perform military maneuvers on Romanian territory from 1962 on. Until 1967, Romanian communists have refused large scale applications, participating only in 1964 and 1967 on exercises ‘developed on the P.R of Bulgaria’s territory’.³⁸ After 1964, the new Soviet leadership – Nikita Khrushchev was replaced trough a coup d’état by its former subordinate Leonid Brezhnev – pressured the RSR for a growing integration of its military forces in the WTO’s structures, a fact which only further deteriorated the relation between the two states, already at a historical low.³⁹ Starting with 1969, due to the consequences of the military intervention in Czechoslovakia and to the straining of political relationships within the ‘socialist camp’, the RSR became aware of the imprudence of continuing to speak on a defying tone about East-European military problems and it will get involved more frequently in WTO’s activities, even if its overall participation remained sporadic.⁴⁰

In general, the RSR’s interactions with the WTO were formal in relation to the involvement degree of the other member states, but one cannot affirm that the Bucharest leaders have neglected the duties incumbing them as signatories of the pact. They only maintained the at a ‘minimal level’.⁴¹ After 1970 there were allowed a certain type of WTO’s actions on Romanian territory, namely simulations of military exercises on maps carried on by officers; the involvement of effective military contingencies, as in the case of other member states, was not allowed because they would have entailed the fear of violating the national sovereignty and of ceding the leadership of the Romanian army to the Soviets. Ceaușescu was highly sensible regarding this aspect. His romantic heroism, coupled with the vanity of being the supreme commander of the Army forces was taking the lead: ‘«the Romanian army will receive orders only from the supreme party and state organs and at the call of the people, and (…) will never receive orders from outside»’. The nature of the relation between the RSS and WTO is plastic and ironically described by Cristopher Jones ‘«after the 1963 joint exercises (Aurel Braun advances 1962 as the year the joint activities of the

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pact within the Romanian borders stopped, m.n.) Romania never allowed maneuvers on Romanian soil, although it sent personnel to the WTO which the Romanians described as observatories, and the Soviet described as participants»’.⁴²

Beside, or reasoning with the ideological direction of the relations between the Moscow centre and its east-European satellites, the military component plays an important role as well. The Soviet Union intervened military when, Jones argues, not necessarily the Leninist ideology entered a stage of collapse, as it happen in 1956 in Hungary or in 1968 in Czechoslovakia, but when the local communist regime did not manage to mobilize the population against an eventual external aggression. Tito’s Yugoslavia, Gomu ka’s Poland and ɫ Ceaușescu’s Romania were not part of this category. In case of an intervention in one of those countries, their communist regime could count, at least partially and on this regard, on the support of a great part of the population. Even if the defensive forces had no chance against the invader, the geopolitical risks which a scenario like this entailed convinced Moscow that prudence is preferable.⁴³ I agree with Jones to a certain point: yes, political realism had a considerable weight among socialist countries which pretended they overcome it, unlike the

‘imperialist camp’ which transformed into a central international strategy, but, on the other hand, we cannot place the Leninist ideocratic framework on a second position in this equation. On the contrary, we are more likely to deal with a Leninist realism, to say so, at least until the first half of the 1960’s, when Europeanized Leninism still believed sincerely in the feasibility of the global revolution, even if in rather social-cultural than political-military terms.

In fact, the main inadvertence of the RSR and WTO’s relationship resided in the fact that ‘the Romanians had the tendency to see the Warsaw Pact more as a traditionally military alliance of sovereign states than as a military fraternity of socialist countries which share objectives, social systems and an identical ideology’,⁴⁴ something that reasoned perfectly with the independence ambitions and the heroic posture in which romantic Leninism imagined itself and aimed to be perceived on the international stage. But, on the other hand, the RSR did not passed over the limits of Soviet tolerance in the military affairs of the ‘socialist camp’, as it did not in political and economic regards as well.

Ceaușescu criticized roughly, in 1968, the Dresden discussions regarding the centralization of WTO, to which the RSR was not invited. The meeting foreshadowed the imminent invasion of Czechoslovakia which was met with hostility in Bucharest.

‘At the Dresden meeting our country was not invited.

We do not reproach anyone this. What kept our attention is however that at this meeting were discussed problems of the C.M.E.A. (Council for mutual economic assistance, m.n.) and of the United Armed Forces Commandment of the Warsaw Treaty participant states. We consider that discussing such problems, which refer to international organisms to which’s

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foundation Romania did not took part, cannot be done only by some member states. It surprises us the fact that it was discussed about the military commandment of the states participating to the Warsaw treaty, because in Sofia was decided by all delegations that the ministries of armed forces would elaborate, in a six months term, proposals for improving the activity of this commandment. (…).

As the experience so far has proven, such actions and procedures are not likely to contribute to the enforcement of these organisms, to the increase of confidence, collaboration and unity of the socialist countries.⁴⁵

The WTO was considered an organization with a pure defensive role, which would act ‘only when a country of those which have associated in this organization would be attacked by an imperialist country’.⁴⁶ According to Ceaușescu, the force and cohesion of the WTO consisted in the permanent enforcement of national capacities of the member states, not in its centralization, from which only the contrary would have resulted. Even since 1966, when the new Soviet team, lead by Brezhnev, tried to redefine the WTO in terms as advantageous to Moscow as possible, the RCP’s leadership affirmed that is ‘not suitable to exist representants of the Supreme Commandment of the United Armed Forces in the armies of the states participating to the Warsaw Treaty’,⁴⁷ a position which the RSR will never abandon.

‘The thesis that tries to be accredited lately (at the end of the 1960’s, m.n.), according to which the common defense of the socialist countries against an imperialist attack assumes the limitation or the renouncement of sovereignty by any state participating to the Treaty does not correspond to the principles of the relations between socialist countries and cannot be under any circumstances accepted.

Appurtenance to the Warsaw Treaty does not only not question the sovereignty of member countries, does not

«limit» in a way or another their state independence, but, on the contrary, as it is provided even in the Treaty, it is a way of enforing the independence and national sovereignty of each state’.

Not the resurgence of centralism, which would have reminded of periods from the international communist movement that literally loathe the RSR, the general secretary of the RCP considered to be the solution to the security problems of the ‘socialist camp’, but, as we already mentioned, their military capacities: ‘the forces of the countries anticipating to the Warsaw Treaty are based on the force and strength of each national army’, and ‘the responsibility of every state is to strengthen its own army’.⁴⁸ Pretending to act trough the